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ABSTRACT
Content-based routing (CBR) is a powerful model that sup-
ports scalable asynchronous communication among large sets
of geographically distributed nodes. Yet, preserving privacy
represents a major limitation for the wide adoption of CBR,
notably when the routers are located in public clouds. In-
deed, a CBR router must see the content of the messages
sent by data producers, as well as the filters (or subscrip-
tions) registered by data consumers. This represents a major
deterrent for companies for which data is a key asset, as for
instance in the case of financial markets or to conduct sen-
sitive business-to-business transactions. While there exists
some techniques for privacy-preserving computation, they
are either prohibitively slow or too limited to be usable in
real systems. In this paper, we follow a different strategy
by taking advantage of trusted hardware extensions that
have just been introduced in off-the-shelf processors and
provide a trusted execution environment. We exploit Intel’s
new software guard extensions (SGX) to implement a CBR
engine in a secure enclave. Thanks to the hardware-based
trusted execution environment (TEE), the compute-intensive
CBR operations can operate on decrypted data shielded by
the enclave and leverage efficient matching algorithms. Ex-
tensive experimental evaluation shows that SGX adds only
limited overhead to insecure plaintext matching outside se-
cure enclaves while providing much better performance and
more powerful filtering capabilities than alternative software-
only solutions. To the best of our knowledge, this work is
the first to demonstrate the practical benefits of SGX for
privacy-preserving CBR.
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Content-based routing (CBR) is a flexible and powerful
paradigm for scalable communication among distributed pro-
cesses. It decouples data producers from consumers, and
dynamically routes messages based on their content. While
the publish/subscribe communication model has been ex-
tensively studied over more than a decade [11], and many
implementations have been proposed (e.g., [26, 7, 19]), it still
fails to reach wide deployment and usage in the era of cloud
computing.
One of the major reasons to the lack of general adoption
can be tracked down to privacy concerns. Indeed, CBR re-
quires router components to filter messages by matching their
content against a (potentially large) collection of subscrip-
tions that act as a reverse index and, hence, must be stored
by the filtering engines. In turn, this requires the router to
see the content of both the messages and the subscriptions,
which represents a major threat for companies for which
data is a key asset. For instance, in the emblematic exam-
ple of financial trading, stock quotes published by exchange
platforms have commercial value and must be protected,
while subscriptions may reveal sensitive information about a
client’s portfolio and must also be secured.
Several approaches to supporting privacy-preserving pub-
lish/subscribe have been proposed recently [20, 25], but
none provides at the same time powerful filtering capabilities
and high performance. Approaches that rely on sophisti-
cated cryptographic techniques like (fully) homomorphic
encryption can support a wide range of operations but are
prohibitively slow—several orders of magnitude slower than
plaintext filtering. Performance can be improved by exploit-
ing specialised techniques like asymmetric scalar-product
preserving encryption (ASPE) [7], but these approaches suf-
fer from severe limitations in the type of operations they
support, which is typically restricted to equality matching
or degraded forms of range queries. Furthermore, these tech-
niques also often introduce additional overheads, e.g., ASPE’s
space complexity grows exponentially with the number of
attributes.
In order to combine both security and performance, one
can instead resort on hardware-based secure execution envi-
ronments. However, such extensions have been so far lim-
ited to narrow, domain-specific applications (e.g., military)
and unsuitable for deployment in cloud environments, no-
tably because of their high cost and dependency on custom
hardware. This is about to change thanks to availability
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of trusted execution environments (TEEs) in commodity
processors. In particular, processors built using Intel’s new
Skylake microarchitecture support a new extension set, called
software guard extensions (SGX), that allows users to exe-
cute cryptographically-signed applications in a secure enclave
that is shielded from other code running on the same pro-
cessor. Data is encrypted while outside the enclave, but can
be processed in plaintext form (and hence with almost no
performance overhead) inside the enclave.
The first SGX-enabled processors have shipped in late
2015 in a mobile version, and desktop and server variants
have followed in 2016. Hence this technology is very new
and still largely untested in real-world settings. In this pa-
per, we introduce an original CBR architecture that exploits
the SGX technology to execute a routing engine in a secure
enclave. We propose a protocol for securely exchanging cryp-
tographic keys between data producers and consumers, and
the SGX-protected routing engine. Both publications and
subscriptions are encrypted and signed, thus protecting the
system from unauthorised parties observing or tampering
with the information. Our system, called SCBR, thus com-
bines a key exchange protocol and a state-of-the-art routing
engine to provide both security and performance while exe-
cuting under the protection of the secure enclave. To the best
of our knowledge, SCBR is the first system to experimentally
evaluate and demonstrate the benefits of executing CBR in
a TEE.
In this paper, we propose the following contributions. We
first present a detailed description of the SGX technology
and how it can be used to develop secure implementation
(§2). We then introduce an original secure CBR architecture
that combines operations on encrypted data outside enclaves,
and efficient matching of publications and subscriptions in-
side enclaves (§3). We conduct in-depth evaluation on a
real implementation with several workloads to observe the
sources of performance overheads and the various trade-offs
of SGX, and we provide comparative results against plaintext
(insecure) matching as well as an ASPE-based alternative
(§4). The paper is completed by a discussion of related work
(§5) and concluding remarks (§6).
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
Traditionally, one protects the integrity and confidentiality
of applications by enforcing the isolation of applications. An
operating system isolates the applications using hardware
mechanisms like virtual address spaces and privileged in-
structions. Multiple operating systems running on the same
physical host are isolated by the hypervisor using hardware
virtualisation extensions provided by the CPU.
The protection of the application integrity and confiden-
tiality requires so far that both the operating system as well
as the hypervisor are trusted. In cloud environments, at least
the hypervisor and, in some cases, also the operating system
are under the control of the cloud provider. Trusting the
hypervisor and the operating system in cloud environments
can raise legal and technical issues since the cloud provider
is a different legal entity from the application provider.
From a legal point of view, contractual agreements with the
cloud provider could ensure legal protection of the data in-
tegrity and confidentiality. However, such agreements might
be insufficient in case the cloud provider is located in a
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Figure 1: SGX enclaves are a trusted execution en-
vironment for unprivileged applications. Enclaves
can only be created with the help of the operat-
ing system. In this way, the operating system can
control which applications are permitted to create
enclaves as well as the number and the size of the
enclaves.
different jurisdiction. Moreover, from a technical perspec-
tive, operating systems and hypervisor encompass millions
of lines of source code. The number of exploitable bugs
is proportional to the number of lines of code. Hence, on
shared infrastructures, one cannot neglect the probability of
applications being attacked by other tenants’ applications
executing on the same computer. With formal proofs of
the operating system [16], one might be able to reduce the
number of exploitable bugs. Yet, the system administrators
of the cloud provider still have access to all application data
and, therefore, their credentials are often hijacked to gain
access to systems and all application data being processed
[28].
One needs a technology that protects the confidentiality
and integrity of application data from access by any other
software, even software with higher privileges like the hy-
pervisor. Trusted execution environments (TEE) are a way
to protect the integrity and confidentiality of data. ARM
TrustZone [1] is a popular trusted execution environment
that provides a secure world that cannot be accessed by the
normal world. It provides, however, only one secure world.
Hence, applications either need to share the secure world, or
at most one application can use the secure world. Moreover,
the secure world is under the control of a separate operating
system, which means that it can still be accessed by some
system administrator.
Intel SGX is a recently released technology that provides
TEEs implemented by the CPU (see Figure 1). Although
TEE solutions have been proposed and implemented pre-
viously, SGX has the advantage that each application can
create separate secure enclaves to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of its data while it is being processed. This
closes the gap of traditional approaches that protect the data
using protocols like transport layer security (TLS) [8] during
transmission, and using file encryption when storing it—but
so far do not protect it while it is processed.
The protection of data during processing is particularly im-
portant in the context of cloud computing, where applications
run in an environment under the control of a different legal
entity. Developers can ensure the end-to-end confidentiality
and integrity of their application’s data by terminating the
TLS connections that connect the application with its clients
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Figure 2: Sensitive data can be protected inside
of an enclave. This data can be accessed by calling
trusted functions inside of the enclave.
inside of an enclave, and any data at rest remains encrypted
inside the enclave. With this approach, neither the cloud
provider nor any hacker with root access can compromise
the integrity or confidentiality of application data.
The basic idea underlying SGX is that an application can
keep its confidential data inside of an enclave and access
it from within (see Figure 2). For example, an enclave
could protect the credentials of an external database and
additionally ensure that only certain queries are issued, or
limit the maximum frequency of the database queries sent
by this application.
For small applications, SGX can protect application data
even when the attacker has physical access to the computer.
The hardware security perimeter is the CPU package, and all
data belonging to an enclave is encrypted and authenticated
when stored in main memory. External snooping, such as
eavesdropping the memory bus or the system memory itself,
will hence not reveal any data stored inside of enclaves.
All data read from memory is checked for integrity and
freshness by verifying the authentication tags. External data
modifications are therefore detected since the authentication
codes will not match. Feeding the CPU with old data that
was properly encrypted and authenticated is also detected
by keeping track of the latest authentication codes for each
page.
To enable an application to use enclaves, the developer
must provide a signed shared library (.so or .dll) that will
execute inside an enclave. The library itself is not encrypted
and can be inspected before being started, hence no secret
should be stored inside the code.
An enclave is provided with secrets, like certificates and
keys, with the help of a remote attestation protocol. This
protocol can prove that an enclave runs on a genuine Intel’s
processor with SGX and verify that its identity matches that
of the code that the developer asked to start [12]. During re-
mote attestation, a secure channel is established that permits
the remote entity to provide the enclave with secrets.
Enclave code and data are stored in a memory area pre-
defined at boot time, called the enclave page cache (EPC),
which is at the moment limited to 128 MB. Applications
can use approximately 90 MB while the remaining space is
reserved for SGX itself. If an enclave is larger than 90 MB,
any access to an enclave page that does not reside in the
EPC results in a page fault. The page fault is handled by an
SGX driver in the operating system that selects a page of the
EPC to evict, i.e., the page is moved to main memory in case
it was dirty or just dropped if a copy already exists in main
memory. After a page is evicted, the SGX driver loads the
requested page (that triggered the fault) from main memory.
The SGX driver closely interacts with the CPU for eviction
and paging since the CPU keeps track of the authentication
tags of the evicted pages and checks them when loading pages
into the EPC. In this way, one does not need to trust the
SGX driver since it cannot violate the confidentiality nor the
integrity of enclave pages.
Confidentiality in the traffic between CPU and system
memory is achieved by a component called the memory en-
cryption engine (MEE), which is also responsible for provid-
ing tamper resistance and replay protection. Under normal
processor operation, memory transactions that miss the cache
are handled by the memory controller (MC). If however the
cache miss is translated to a protected region, MEE takes
over. In this case, it encrypts or decrypts data before sending
to or fetching from system memory, in addition to performing
integrity checks [12].
Memory checks are made through an integrity tree [10]
that uses a stateful message authentication code (MAC) with
nonces [22] (non repeating numbers, coined to be used only
once). The tree is stored in untrusted memory, except for
the root that is kept on-die and inaccessible from outside. It
reflects the integrity of the whole protected area at a given
time, thus precluding any attacks by means of modification
or replay of values in memory. Any mismatch during a
verification causes a MC lock, which ultimately requires a
machine reboot [12].
The SGX system provides each enclave with a seal key that
can be used to store data on stable storage and access it again
upon subsequent execution. This facilitates the development
of applications that can restart an enclave without requiring
a new remote attestation. The enclave instead loads its
secrets from a configuration file encrypted with the enclave-
specific seal key and kept in stable storage. Note that an
attacker could still try to serve an enclave with a previous
version of a configuration file that is properly encrypted and
authenticated. To prevent such replay attacks, an enclave
can use the monotonic counter facilities provided by the
platform. Each time an enclave writes a new version of its
configuration data, it increments a monotonic counter and
stores the new value inside the configuration file. When the
enclave restarts, it reads the monotonic counter and checks
that it matches the values stored in the configuration file.
3. SCBR ARCHITECTURE
We describe in this section the overall architecture of
SCBR. We first explain the rationale that drove the design of
the system. We then introduce the considered model, and we
present the principle of subscription registration and message
publication. We finally discuss some implementation details.
3.1 Objectives and Assumptions
Designing a secure, privacy-preserving CBR system is not
trivial, even if one can rely on trusted hardware. Consider
the example of a stock exchange publishing streams of finan-
cial data (stock quotes). Consumers who want to protect
their confidential data (portfolio) have to trust the code of
the CBR engine, which typically originates from the stock
exchange. They may also want to restrict the ability to see
their subscriptions to a single publisher, and not other data
providers that leverage the same software and infrastructure
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Figure 3: Components and roles.
(e.g., different stock exchange operators).
We therefore consider a simple model based on the fol-
lowing assumptions. The publish/subscribe system operates
as a service under the control of a single “service provider”
that publishes data. Consumers are the clients of the service
and typically pay recurring fees to have access to the data.
Hence, there must be ways for the producers to control which
subscribers can join and read data from the service, and to
exclude clients that stop paying their fees or behave in a
non-trustworthy manner. The publishers operate within the
administrative domain of the service provider from which
data originates, and they are trusted by the clients for the
purpose of the considered service. This model closely maps,
for instance, to the aforementioned scenario of the stock
exchange.
Given the trust relationships between the different com-
ponents of the system, it appears clear that publishers and
clients must share cryptographic keys that are not known
by the infrastructure. Furthermore, there should be some
lightweight mechanisms for the publishers to (dis-)allow
clients from accessing new data, independently of whether
they had been legitimate customers in the past.
3.2 System Model
Following the considerations discussed above, we distin-
guish three main roles in our architecture, as illustrated in
Figure 3:
• The service provider (or data provider) produces in-
formation flows for the clients, typically “as a service”
and for a fee. The data may be produced by mul-
tiple sources (publishers) operating within the same
administrative domain.
• The infrastructure provider hosts the CBR engines in
the cloud. It provides secure hardware (SGX-based
enclaves) and performs the actual data routing and
transmission through its network. As it operates under
a different administrative domain and may share its
resources among several customers (in a multi-tenant
configuration), the infrastructure provider is trusted
neither by the data provider nor by its clients.
• The clients of the service are the end users who are
interested in the actual data and subscribe to informa-
tion flows via the CBR engines. They trust the data
providers but not the infrastructure.
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Figure 4: Interaction amongst entities.
Messages are composed of a payload, which is of interest to
the end users but opaque to the SCBR system, and a header
that contains several attributes and associated values. The
CBR engines filter messages based on the attribute values in
their header.
Subscriptions are composed of predicates specifying con-
straints over the attributes. Predicates can include equality
constraints or generally any kind of ranges over the values of
the attributes. For instance, a subscriber interested in spe-
cific quotes for a company when it reaches a certain price can
register a subscription such as “symbol = "HAL"∧price < 50”.
We say that a message matches a subscription if its header
satisfies the constraints expressed in the subscription predi-
cate.
Subscriptions are typically stored by the CBR engine in
a dedicated data structure that operates as an “inverted”
database. By exploiting relationships between the different
predicates, as pioneered in Siena [5], one can both reduce the
memory footprint of the subscription index and improve the
matching speed. In particular, the property of containment
(also called covering) can be leveraged to avoid unnecessary
tests. Essentially, we say that a subscription s contains or
covers another subscription s′, denoted by s w s′, if any
event that matches s′ also matches s. That is, s is more
general than s′. For instance, predicate “x > 0” covers both
predicates “x = 1” and subscription “x > 0 ∧ y = 1”. Note
that the containment relationship creates a partial order
on subscriptions. In SCBR, we use a matching algorithm
that exploits containment to minimise the footprint of the
subscriptions stored in the enclave, where only a limited
amount of memory is available.
SCBR makes use of both symmetric and asymmetric (pub-
lic key) cryptography. The former is more efficient and is
used for communication between the publishers and the en-
claves, while the latter is used between clients and the service
provider when registering subscriptions, as will be detailed
later.
3.3 The Subscription Process
As mentioned above, SCBR was designed so that producers
are the owners of the generated data. They have therefore
the ability to decide whether they accept a subscription from
a client, as well as to subsequently invalidate it. To control
access to the service, we rely upon an additional admission
phase when registering a new subscription. The client cannot
freely submit its subscriptions to the CBR engines in the
cloud, but has to go through a data producer. Informally,
the registration process works as follows (see Figure 4).
Consider a client c that wants to register a subscription s by
the routing engine r and subsequently receive message m sent
by the data producer p. The publisher has a public/private
key pair (PK /PK−1), as well as symmetric key (SK ) that
is shared with the code running in the enclave, but unknown
to clients and to the infrastructure provider—this is made
possible thanks to SGX, as explained in §2.
1. The client first encrypts its subscription s using the data
provider’s public key, hence preventing unauthorised
parties to see it, and sends the resulting encrypted
subscription {s}PK to p.
2. Then, after decrypting and verifying that the subscrip-
tion is valid, as well as verifying the client’s status, the
publisher re-encrypts s using SK and signs it. It then
sends the encrypted subscription {s}SK to the routing
engine r.
3. Finally, r validates and decrypts the subscription inside
the enclave (remember that SK is only known to the
code running within the enclave), and inserts it in its
index.
Note that the subscriptions also embed information about
the clients that it visible to the code running outside the
enclave. This allows the router to establish connexions with
the consumers and forward relevant messages to them.
3.4 The Publication Process
Once subscriptions have been registered by the clients,
data can be routed along the reverse path. The publication
process works as follows.
4. The publisher encrypts the header of the message m
using SK , which is only known to the code running in-
side the enclave (encryption of the payload is discussed
below). The encrypted message {m}SK is then sent to
the routing engine r.
5. Upon receiving the message, r decrypts the header in
the enclave, leaving the opaque payload outside, and
matches it against its subscription index. The result of
this operation is a list of clients that have registered a
matching subscription.
6. Finally, r forwards the encrypted message payload to all
clients that have been identified as part of the matching
operation.
The payload of messages is encrypted separately using a
(symmetric) group key shared between the publisher and the
consumers. This allows publishers to periodically change the
key as the population of customers evolves. In particular,
this enables publishers to prevent clients that have cancelled
their membership from accessing newly published messages.
This process is orthogonal to the encryption performed for
protecting the header and subscriptions, and used for privacy-
preserving CBR. It is hence out of the scope of this paper
and not discussed further.
Note that having multiple routers in the path would in-
crease the complexity of the key management between pub-
lishers and matchers. We believe that an overlay broker
network is not the best architecture for a scalable privacy-
preserving pub/sub engine, and we would rather advocate a
similar structure as in StreamHub [3] where we specialise the
system components in order to gain performance. In such an
architecture, the current publisher-matcher key management
scheme could be simply replicated.
Workload Proportion of Number of Subs values
name equality predicates attributes distribution
e100a1 100% : 1 eq. pred.
e80a1
8–11 (original)
e80a2
20% : 0 eq. pred.
2× more
e80a4
80% : 1 eq. pred.
4× more
15% : 0 eq. pred. Uniform
extsub2
60% : 1 eq. pred.
2× more
15% : 2 eq. pred.
extsub4
10% : 3 eq. pred.
4× more
e80a1z100 20% : 0 eq. pred. Zipf on symbol
e80a1zz100 80% : 1 eq. pred. 8–11 (original) Zipf on all
e100a1zz100 100% : 1 eq. pred. attributes
Table 1: Workloads description (adapted from [4]).
3.5 Implementation Details
Intel provides a set of tools to aid the coding and the
fulfilment of SGX requirements. Their software development
kit (SDK) comprises a generator for proxies and stubs written
in C that should be linked to both trusted and untrusted
code. This generation is based on a text-based configuration
file that follows the syntax of the enclave definition language,
which basically defines the interface of the edge routines.
Since system calls and input/output instructions are not
allowed inside secure containers, Intel also provides libraries
that are guaranteed to comply with these limitations. We
used Intel’s STL implementation and AES-CTR encryption
functions for enclave code.
The SDK also includes the enclave signing tool responsible
for the measurement and signature (§2) of the shared library
that will be loaded in the protected container [13]. Intel’s
SDK is provided both for Windows and Linux, and in this
work, we used the latter version.
In SCBR, encryption outside the enclave is implemented
using the Crypto++ library,1 using respectively AES-CTR
and RSA for symmetric and asymmetric encryption. We use
the ZeroMQ library2 for communication, and we serialise
both plain-text or encrypted messages in Base64 text format.
Information about page faults is obtained via the Linux
system’s getrusage function (attribute minflt). Similarly,
we rely on a Linux system call to configure and read the
processor’s performance counters for cache misses.
4. EVALUATION
We evaluated the system as described in Figure 4, with
both the producer and consumer running in one machine and
the filtering engine in another. Measurements were collected
at the machine running the filter, which was equipped with
an Intel Skylake CPU model i7-6700 running at 3.4 GHz with
an 8 MB cache and 8 GB of main memory. We allocated
128 MB of main memory to EPC (maximum allowed).
To evaluate SCBR and to facilitate comparison, we reused
the workloads from previous work [4] composed of 9 datasets.
They were built based on real data corresponding to ran-
domly selected stock quotes from the Yahoo! finance website.3
Approximately 250,000 entries were collected in a period of 5
years, with publications composed by 8 to 11 attributes. The
entries collected were used to produce synthetic subscrip-
tion datasets containing an assortment of equality and range
1http://www.cryptopp.com/
2http://zeromq.org/
3http://finance.yahoo.com/
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predicates on the quotes’ attributes. Besides, subscriptions
were selected according to (1) a uniform random distribution
and (2) a Zipfian law with exponent s = 1. In order to
assess the algorithms’ performance with a greater number of
variables and different levels of containment, some workloads
were synthesised with twice and four times the number of
attributes of the original publications, by merging data from
multiple quotes. Table 1 summarises the characteristics of
the datasets used.
Our first experiment aimed at evaluating the performance
overhead caused by executing our filter inside an enclave.
We filled the subscription database with datasets with 1,000,
2,500, 5,000, 10,000, 25,000, 50,000 and 100,000 subscrip-
tions, reaching a total memory size of approximately 43MB
for the largest dataset. Thereafter, we sent a batch of 1,000
publications to be matched against the subscriptions and
measured the time it took to accomplish each filtering opera-
tion. We ran an identical setup with and without encryption,
inside and outside an enclave, using the same filtering code.
When using encryption, publications and subscriptions were
encrypted in the producer and decrypted in the filter us-
ing AES-CTR. The average results for the first workload
(e100a1 ) are shown in Figure 5. By considering the proximity
of the lines with and without encryption, we can see that
encryption overhead is small and nearly constant. Indeed,
this overhead remains below 5µs both inside or outside the
enclave, which is negligible when compared to the matching
time given a reasonable large database size. The overhead
resulting from the enclave is more significant, reaching nearly
40% for the largest set of subscriptions considered in our
experiments, which is explained by the occurence of cache
misses (cache size is shown by the vertical line).
We then focused on the influence of the workloads. In
order to understand the effect of different datasets on SCBR
performance, we first executed each of them without encryp-
tion outside secure enclaves. Results are shown in Figure 6.
The first (e100a1 ) and last (e100a1zz100 ) workloads show
the best performance, since all subscriptions contain equality
predicates and the subscription set forms deeper containment
trees. In contrast, datasets with more attributes (e80a4 and
extsub4 ) perform worse because they yield indexes with more
roots and shallow trees, therefore inducing more comparisons
to traverse the whole database.
Figure 7 displays separate measurements for each workload
running SCBR inside and outside an enclave (both using AES
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Figure 6: Performance of the containment-based al-
gorithm applied to the different workloads in plain-
text, outside enclaves.
encryption). We also measured, for each workload, the per-
formance of our implementation of ASPE [7, 4] as a baseline
for a software-only alternative that does not use enclaves. We
measured only the matching step, and not the encryption or
decryption of ASPE messages. The presented ASPE perfor-
mance cost was therefore inherent to its matching algorithm,
which grows faster than any other strategy when increasing
the size of the subscription database. The difference is more
substantial for the first and last workloads, although it re-
mains close to at least one order of magnitude in all setups.
These observations indicate that the performance penalties
of SGX are largely tolerable when considering software-only
alternatives for secure filtering, at least when the amount of
memory used by the routing engine remains below the EPC
assigned size. We will further explore this matter below.
Another interesting aspect is the gap between the curves
corresponding to execution inside and outside the enclaves.
After approximately 10,000 subscriptions, the versions in-
side and outside enclaves begin to drift apart due to the
number of memory accesses necessary to accomplish every
comparison. At some point, the filtering data does not fit
completely in the processor’s cache memory and cache misses
start to occur more frequently. When this happens, data
must be fetched from system memory and, in the case of
enclave executions, it must be decrypted and checked for
integrity and freshness. Moreover, the evicted enclave’s cache
node must be encrypted before being sent to system memory.
That behavior is consistent with cache miss rates (measured
outside the enclaves), which are also reported in Figure 7.
We only measured cache misses outside the enclaves, because
our Linux version failed to properly monitor the cache per-
formance counters inside enclaves. Since the code running
inside and outside the enclaves is the same, it is reasonable
to assume that cache miss rates would be similar.
We finally wanted to observe the performance penalties
when exceeding the maximum protected memory size and
paging begins to happen. Since EPC memory is limited,
whenever it is full and more space is required, pages must
be evicted from the protected area to the main (untrusted)
memory. Accordingly, a page swap occurs every time a
previously evicted page is accessed. Besides the fact that
system memory is slower than the processor’s cache, which
already imposes performance costs, memory page swaps are
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Figure 7: Comparison of different approaches with varying workloads.
serviced by the operating system and hence incur an even
higher overhead.
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Figure 8: Loss in performance when exceeding EPC
memory limit.
Figure 8 shows the combined results of two executions
when populating the in-memory subscription storage. In
one execution we registered subscriptions inside an enclave,
and outside in the other. We used the workload e80a1 in
plaintext format, and we executed the same registration code
in both experiments. Each point of the graph accounts for
an average of 5,000 points, from a set of 500,000 subscrip-
tions. We plotted the page fault rates observed by dividing
their numbers from inside and outside enclaves. The values
measured outside are very large for the largest database size,
reaching up to 40,000 more page faults.
We also divided the time it took to register one subscription
inside the enclave by the time required outside. We can
clearly see the point where paging starts to take place, when
memory consumption reaches just over 90 MB. The vertical
line shows the EPC memory limit, which comprises both
the enclaved application memory and SGX internal data
structures. At the maximum size of our experiment (213 MB),
registering a subscription inside the enclave took 18 times
more time than doing it outside. These results show that the
overhead grows outrageously when paging starts to happen,
and they make a strong case for further studies on optimising
the memory footprint of applications running inside secure
SGX enclaves.
5. RELATEDWORK
SGX was introduced only very recently and only few prac-
tical algorithms using TEEs have been already proposed. As
far as we could reach in the available literature, SCBR is
the first attempt to demonstrate the practical benefits of
SGX for privacy-preserving CBR. This section comments
on a couple of related efforts that propose to use SGX in a
similar context.
If using SGX for CBR is new, secure content-based publish
subscribe is not. There is a vast amount of literature on the
subject, including major surveys [20, 25]. We overview a few
relevant existing secure CBR systems (or families thereof)
and we discuss the conditions under which an enclaved CBR
version can provide an important improvement.
5.1 SGX as a Secure Building Block
In a recent paper, Kim et al. [15] describe three case
studies that leverage TEEs in the context of networking
applications. One of them illustrated how SGX can improve
on privacy by running parts of software-defined network
controllers. Another case study shows that SGX could be
used for protecting Tor onion routers from attacks made
by participating nodes. The last one proposes to use SGX
for executing in-network functions. All case studies share
with SCBR the underlying idea of secure execution inside
untrusted nodes.
VC3 [23] is a distributed, secure execution environment
extending the Apache Hadoop MapReduce framework. Each
worker node hosts an enclaved loader that runs a key ex-
change protocol, and decrypts and executes map/reduce
functions. VC3 guarantees global integrity by generating
work summaries within enclaved workers that can be user-
verified after the end of a job. The proposed environment
cleanly isolates within enclaves the computation made under
a well established model. SCBR shares some design ideas
with VC3, but the inherently structured map/reduce com-
munication pattern makes it unpractical for implementing
publish/subscribe (while the converse would be possible).
5.2 Secure Content-based Publish/Subscribe
Content-based publish/subscribe appears at first sight to
be incompatible with privacy preservation, as by definition
messages must be filtered based on their content, i.e., the
filtering engine should be able to see both the data of publi-
cations and subscriptions. To make the problem even more
challenging, many filtering techniques exploit structural prop-
erties of the information exchanged between publishers and
subscribers. In particular, by structuring the containment
relations between subscriptions, one can build efficient data
structures to store subscriptions and match publications.
Containment allows for a significant reduction of the number
of subscriptions stored as well as the number of matching
evaluations executed per publication. As a consequence, con-
tainment is used in most CBR systems in use today [5, 6,
17], which makes them largely incompatible with classical
cryptographic techniques for privacy preservation.
A recent survey suggests classifying publish/subscribe sys-
tems preserving confidentiality in two categories, depending
on whether they leverage traditional security techniques or
they rely on special-purpose forms of encryption [20].
Solutions based on traditional techniques encrypt sensitive
information that traverse untrusted domains, hence basi-
cally preventing the infrastructure from filtering publications
based on their content. They propose architectures designed
to respond to specific security threats, through creative com-
binations of access control and key management mechanisms.
Most of these solutions integrate elaborated access control
models into existing event-based middleware [2, 29, 26], or-
ganising routing brokers in sets that share keys to encrypt
or decrypt data. Different encryption granularities are used,
ranging from single attributes to the entire message. Key
management imposes an important overhead and content-
based routing is only possible in routers that have the keys to
decrypt the relevant matching attributes. Although these so-
lutions isolate traffic between mutually distrusting domains,
by eventually relying on plaintext matching they discourage
their use in untrusted hardware as found in clouds.
In contrast to filtering with plaintext, recent research has
also explored the development of specific encryption algo-
rithms for publish/subscribe that allow for a direct match of
encrypted publications with encrypted subscriptions. One
such solution, which we evaluated in this paper, is asym-
metric scalar product-preserving encryption (ASPE) [7], ini-
tially introduced for secure query computation on encrypted
databases. Publication attributes and subscriptions con-
straints are represented as coordinates of multidimensional
points. ASPE is based on an exact relation preserving iso-
morphism and supports subscription containment, albeit it is
vulnerable to known-plaintext attacks. ASPE is asymmetric,
hence the decryption key can be shared without compromis-
ing the solution. Given that ASPE’s matching complexity is
prohibitively high when using a large number of attributes,
researchers have proposed to enhance it with a pre-filtering
approach [4] that expresses equality constraints using Bloom
filters. This allows for quickly identifying subscriptions that
are known not to match the publication as their equality
constraint(s) cannot be satisfied.
Li et al. [18] proposed an approach supporting interval
matching by transforming it into prefix-matching and us-
ing a prefix-preserving encryption algorithm that supports
containment. The scheme has limited resistance under at-
tack and requires a shared key between publisher and the
subscriber. Ion [14] subsequently devised a similar prefix-
matching algorithm derived from attribute-based encryption
that presents stronger privacy guarantees but with much
higher encryption cost. Encryption is based on El Gamaal
[9], thus eliminating the need for shared keys between par-
ticipants (although common key material must be retrieved
from a trusted authority).
Raiciu et al. [21] proposed a hybrid matching mechanism
that uses different encryption techniques according to the
types of values and constraints. It can handle partial string
matching using a specialised bloom filter, range matching
using a prefix-preserving encryption as proposed by Li et al.
(described above), and a fast protocol for matching arbitrary
subscription functions based on Yao’s garbled circuits [27].
The mechanism supports containment but may yield false
negatives. Furthermore, two identical subscriptions encrypt
to identical cyphertexts, which is semantically insecure.
Nabeel et al. [19] proposed a solution that can be used
with any constraints on numerical values based on homo-
morphic encryption. It allows for containment, but requires
common knowledge of the parameters needed for homomor-
phic encryption between publishers and subscribers and it
can only match numerical values.
Tariq et al. [24] proposed a peer-to-peer architecture based
on attribute-based encryption, which supports numerical
comparisons and prefix/suffix constraints on strings. Peers
can act as publishers or subscribers and publications are de-
livered through an overlay structured as a set of containment-
based trees. It depends on a central and trusted authority
that provides master public keys for publication encryption,
and subscriptions present weak confidentiality.
All encryption schemes presented in the solutions above
are either heavier or weaker than standard production-level
encryption (e.g., AES). By using symmetric encryption and
plaintext matching under trusted execution, SCBR is able
to combine the best of both worlds. It provides a novel
scheme that (i) supports confidentiality for events and filters;
(ii) permits publishers to express further constraints about
who can access their events; (iii) handles filters that can
express very complex constraints on events even if brokers
are not able to access any information in clear on both
events and filters; (iv) allows brokers to use state-of-the art
containment-based filtering, and finally (v) does not require
publishers and subscribers to share any keys.
6. CONCLUSION
We presented the architecture and evaluation of SCBR, a
secure content-based routing engine that takes advantage of
the trusted execution environment provided by shielded SGX
enclaves, a technology available on recently released off-the-
shelf Intel processors. In doing so, we can leverage state-of-
the-art techniques for efficient filtering in plaintext, since the
trusted perimeter is limited to the CPU die. Outside that
boundary, private data is always encrypted and protected
from tampering and replay attacks, even from operating
systems, hypervisors, and administrators with physical access
to machines. As a result, we do not suffer from the prohibitive
performance and space overheads of software-based secure
approaches, such as homomorphic encryption or dedicated
algorithms like ASPE. On the other hand, the safety of our
system is entirely based on SGX and it could be compromised
by design flaws, hardware bugs, or even trapdoors.
As part of our extensive experiments, we tested the system
with nine different workloads and analysed the influence of
cache misses and page faults on the code running within
secure enclaves. While both events introduce some overhead
(as compared to insecure matching outside the enclave), per-
formance degrades much more heavily with the latter, which
occurs when exceeding the available amount of protected
memory. We also compared the performance of SGX against
the software-based ASPE alternative and observed that SGX
performs systematically better as long as memory usage is
kept below 90 MB. Performance deterioration when exhaust-
ing memory is unsurprising. Indeed, any application that
exceeds the EPC size limit will undergo heavy overheads
and scalability restrictions. This limitation can be overcome
through horizontal scalability or future hardware evolutions
of SGX.
Our encouraging results open the way for further research
on smart handling of subscriptions and matching algorithms
in order to minimise memory footprint and build an enclave-
efficient system. As future work, we intend to explore the
possibilities of efficiently use the enclave border and the
memory hierarchy. For instance, we observed that cache
misses starts to happen when we have roughly 10,000 sub-
scriptions, which represents 4.37 MB of memory storage and
corresponds to slightly more than half of the 8 MB cache in
the CPU. Also, we have shown that paging plays an impor-
tant role in reducing the enclave performance. We will work
on optimising our data structures to avoid paging and cache
misses, by smartly storing and accessing the containment
trees, splitting them into enclaved and external parts, and
appropriately fitting them into cache lines. Finally, there are
also opportunities to optimise our underlying implementation
in order to reduce the frequency of enclave enters/exits (e.g.,
with OS calls). We plan to explore different strategies such
as using message batching, implementing message exchanges
at the enclave border, or even bringing more of the simple
OS operations into the enclave itself. All in all, we expect
that these mechanisms and optimisations will contribute to
further decrease the overhead of running inside an enclave.
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